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Highlights: 
 Slightly increasing line redundancy and decentralizing generators are effective for reducing load 
 shedding and line failures 
 Better line redundancy and generator decentralization also reduce uncertainty in cascading failure 
 consequences 
 Optimal power re‐dispatch successfully manages cascading failures in all considered power grid 
 configurations 
 Coupling synthetic yet realistic power grids with direct current (DC) cascading failure simulators 
 supports planning against cascading failures 
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ABSTRACT. To systematically study key factors affecting cascading failures in power systems, this 
paper advances algorithms for generating synthetic power grids with realistic topological and electrical 
features, while computationally quantifying how such factors influence system performance 
probabilistically. Key parameters affecting line outages and power losses during cascading failures 
include line redundancy, load/generator layout and re-dispatch strategies. Our study combines a synthetic 
power grid generator with a direct current (DC) cascading failure simulator. The impact of each of the 
factors and their interactions unravel useful insights for interventions aimed at reducing the probabilities 
of large blackouts on existing and future power systems. Moreover, conclusions drawn from a spectrum 
of different power grid topologies and electrical configurations offer more generality than typically 
attained when studying specific test cases. Line redundancy and distributed generation appear as the most 
efficacious parameters for reducing the probabilities of large power losses and multiple overloads, 
although the effect decays with network density. Also, re-dispatch strategies are more influential on the 
distribution of the cascade failure size in terms of line failures. These and related results provide the basis 
for probabilistic analyses and future design of evolving power transmission systems under uncertainty. 
Keywords: power grids, vulnerability assessment, cascading failures, DC power flow, sensitivity 
analysis, probabilistic performance metrics. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The impact that a power transmission system‘s topology and associated electrical features have on overall 
system reliability is still not well understood, especially when their joint effect is considered during 
cascading failure events. In fact, when considering a fixed network topology, many different electrical 
configurations and states are possible, as placements of generation units or dispatch strategies result in 
different power system dynamics, and hence reliability considerations.  
Efforts in power system reliability research have been directed to the study of cascading failures, since 
these failure dynamics have proven serious in economic and social terms [1]. Standard practice in the 
study of cascading failures is to apply power or network flow models to a limited set of test systems to 
understand evolving system behavior [2]–[7]. Also, there are topological studies for simplified yet 
analytical explorations of system properties, typically based on samples of randomly generated networks 
when the electrical data are not available [8]–[11]. However, the probabilistic analysis of power systems 
subjected to uncertain contingencies is still limited, often without the joint effects of topological and 
electrical configurations (e.g., layout, element siting, re-dispatch). Thus, conclusions drawn to date under 
probabilistic models, while valuable, remain not easily generalizable. Our work attempts to bridge this 
gap by applying a cascading failure model based on an N-2 contingency analysis with Direct Current 
(DC) power flow analyses on a sample of synthetic yet realistic power networks generated to capture 
some of the topological as well as electrical and probabilistic features of power systems [12]. 
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While relying on DC power flow adds realism to the cascading failure model, it also requires that the 
synthetic networks be adequate electrically. Hence, we extend the algorithm by Wang et al. [12] to 
produce synthetic power grids suitable for DC power flow computations. The number of features 
characterizing power grids is high, making the impact analysis of all of them prohibitive. Consequently, 
we group key features of power grids into three different macro-areas based on known sensitivity 
analyses [2], [13]: the underlying topology, the electrical properties of its components, and the control 
rules governing the system. This grouping is also consistent with the way each synthetic power grid is 
generated, as the topology is constructed first, then the topology is enriched with the electrical parameters 
(e.g., impedances, power demand and supply levels, generation siting, etc.), and finally, the 
dispatch/control rules are embedded into the cascading failure simulator. 
At the topological level, the line redundancy of the network is chosen as input variable, since adding lines 
is the baseline approach for decreasing systems‘ congestion and has a straightforward interpretation from 
an infrastructural point of view. At the electrical level, the generator/load buses layout is considered a key 
input that we vary in order to compare various degrees of centralization, from clustered to a more 
distributed siting of loads and generators. The interest in power generation layout lies in the evolution 
towards smart grids [1], [14]. Finally, from the operational point of view, we consider two different power 
re-dispatch strategies. 
We carry out computational experiments from full factorial designs to study the effect of key input 
parameters and offer general insights [15].  The input variables involved are fully crossed with each other, 
allowing us to gather data for rich combinations of their selected levels and associated effects on 
cascading failures. Since this approach relies on a catalogue of power grids instead of a particular one, the 
conclusions drawn have more general appeal than what would be possible if considering a single test 
case.  
As for system performance, we study the reliability of the power grid, understood here as the ability of the 
network to deliver power to customers (via a power loss metric), while the physical infrastructure 
integrity is preserved (via counts of outages across lines) [1]. The computational experiments that follow, 
allow us studying power loss and line outages probabilistically, particularly as the topological, electrical 
and control parameters of the synthetic networks vary. This work thus complements two of the 
approaches that dominate existing literature: one general and often probabilistic, but limited to topological 
analyses [16], [17], and the other comprehensive in its electrical aspects but specific to a system model 
[18], [19]. We aim at a middle point, where we use DC power flows and also study a variety of system 
configurations and dispatch strategies, so as to gain generalizable insights for future operation 
management and reliability-based design of evolving power networks.   
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our global strategy to study evolving 
infrastructure, particularly via computational experiments. Section 3 describes the power network 
generation procedure and our updates to make key system parameters tunable. Then, Section 4 describes 
our cascading failure model. Section 5 provides simulation results, and Section 6 discusses outputs and 
draws insights for network operation. Section 7 concludes the paper and provides ideas for future 
research. 
 
2.  GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR STUDYING EVOLVING POWER SYSTEMS 
To explore how key inputs affect cascading failures in power systems, we perform a full factorial 
experimental design to elicit general conclusions.  Appropriate variables and models for our experimental 
designs as discussed next. 
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2.1 Full Factorial Design 
Throughout our work, we will deal with a power grid object defined as follows: 
 
                        (1) 
 
where   is the set of buses,   is the set of lines, and         is the power grid topology. Vector   
captures the impedances of the lines, while            are the power demand, supply, and maximum 
supply of the nodes in  , respectively. Vector   denotes the capacity of the lines. We define the subset 
               as the electrical properties of the power grid. 
Our goal is also to determine which parameters affecting   in Eq. (1) are best at reducing cascading 
failures, so as to translate findings into design guidelines generalizable to evolving power grids. In 
particular, we consider factors such as: line redundancy  , the loads/generators layout K, and re-dispatch 
strategies. Note that topology and electrical features are a function of these factors, such that 
                              
In particular,   will vary in the range        interpolating electrically networks generated by the RT-
nested Small World (RT-nestedSW) algorithm [12], where a realistic topology corresponds to    , an 
associated spanning tree to      and a greedy triangulation (or dense planar network) to    . In this 
way, we are able to produce power grid structures with varying levels of line redundancy. Parameter   
will vary in       and is used to produce power grids with increased decentralized generator layout as K 
increases.  
In addition, we analyze the impact on cascading failures of different re-dispatch strategies. The term re-
dispatch refers to the action of changing the power supply or demand at the power grid‘s nodes in real 
time, so that the total supply and demand are balanced. We compare two re-dispatch strategies in our 
experiments. First, a proportional strategy where power supply and demand at the nodes changes 
proportionally to their initial values, and deemed as a baseline strategy. Second, we consider the OPA 
model [20], which is a simplification of how an operator might intervene in a realistic system when facing 
complex contingencies. It consists of an optimization routine which minimizes the power losses, subject 
to constraints in power carrying limits. The OPA model has been used in applications with fast dynamics 
and long term evolution of power transmission systems [4]. 
The computer experiments are set as follows: power grids with different values of   and K are generated 
with our extended RT-nestedSW algorithm, for all their possible combinations. For each of these power 
grids, two separate N-2 contingency analyses are performed, employing one of the two re-dispatch 
strategies each. This procedure is tantamount to a balanced full factorial experimental design [15], that 
unravels the single and joint effects of input factors. Table 1 shows the planning matrix of the experiment.  
 
Table 1. Planning matrix of the full factorial experiment with each row representing a different factor and 
each column a different level. 
Factors/Levels  0 1 2 
Line Redundancy              
Generators Layout K=0 K=0.5 K=1 
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Re-dispatch R:= Proportional R:= OPA  
 
2.2 Response Variables 
We compute the total power not served      
        
 and the number of line failures from cascades      
       
, 
following N-2 contingency analyses on power grids in  , associated to a pair of lines        .  In 
particular, two distinct lines         are selected and removed from . Hence,  evolves from its initial 
equilibrium state    into a new state          following the dynamics we model trough subsequent 
Algorithm 4.1. This procedure is then repeated with replacement for all distinct pairs of lines belonging to 
 . We then define the total N-2 contingency analysis effects as power loss      and line failures      as 
follows: 
 
        ∑      
        
           (2) 
        ∑      
        
          . (3) 
 
Note that      and      are computed for each power grid topological and electrical configuration as well 
as re-dispatch strategy. Knowing how these performance indicators vary in correspondence to different 
configurations of input factors allows us to understand their global impact on cascading failure 
vulnerability and associated probabilities of occurrence.  
 
3.  SYNTHETIC POWER GRID GENERATION 
The following subsections review the procedure to generate new network topologies in agreement with 
real power grids. Then, the authors explain the role of line redundancy and generator layout factors     
to enable sensitivity analyses. 
 
3.1 Topological Properties of Power Networks 
Consider a power grid topology        , with | |    as the number of generation sources, 
aggregate loads at the substation level, and transmission nodes, and | |    as the number of links or 
transmission lines. Research has shown that commonly used synthetic graph structures such as small 
world [21], scale free [22] and random networks are not able to capture the topological features of real 
power grids [12], [17], [23]. For example, Wang et al. [12] found that power grids have different 
connectivity scaling laws than standard small world graphs. In fact, the average nodal degree     is 
constant and does not scale with the network dimension, as would be the case for the small world model 
[21]. Meanwhile, Cotilla-Sanchez et al. [23] noticed that the average path length    scaling properties 
of real power grids are in between regular grids and small world networks. Overall, these and other 
studies call for models that capture system topology as well as functionality consistent with practical 
power systems [12], [16], [17]. 
 
3.2 The RT-nested Small World Model 
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Wang et al. [12] postulated nesting several small-world (SW) subnetworks into a regular lattice to retain 
electrical system features while using simple topologies that exhibit realistic scaling properties [16], [17]. 
Another power network generator was used in Purchala et al. [24] to test DC power flow accuracy in 
active power considerations. They found bounds for the lines reactances and resistance ratios, below 
which the DC power estimation has unacceptable high errors. The RT-nestedSW model has also been 
refined by Hu et al. and Genger et al. [25], [26] in order to produce synthetic DC and AC power flow test 
cases.  While synthetic models continue development, we adopt the basic RT-nestedSW perspective and 
expand as needed to realize our experimental design.  The method [12], and associated extensions are 
summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Summary of the RT-nested Small World model (RT-nestedSW) and extensions.  
Pseudo-Code RT-nested Small World Model Generation 
Step 1 Select the desired number of subnetworks, their properties, and a geographical distance threshold   . 
Step 2 Construct subnetworks as follows: for each node   select links at random (their number follows a Poisson 
distribution with mean   ) from nodes   belonging to    
   
 {  |   |      (i,j are the indices of the 
nodes considered). 
Step 3 Rewire the subnetwork links using a Markov chain model. 
Step 4 Randomly connect the subnetworks with each other, through lattice connections. 
Step 5 Assign the lines‘ impedances using a suitable probability distribution model. 
Step 6 Assign power demand and supply to the nodes in the network. (Extended) 
Step 7 Assign lines capacities. (Extended) 
 
The input parameters necessary to initialize the algorithm in Step 1 {        , and the number of 
subnetworks}, are estimated from the IEEE 118-node system [27] as our reference realistic network 
throughout the study. Hence, Steps 1-4 generate power networks         with topological properties 
consistent with real systems.  Then, in Step  , line reactances are randomly generated from a specified 
heavy-tailed distribution fitted to the real power grid that one wishes to use as a reference. In this work, a 
Gamma distribution is found to fit well the impedances of the IEEE 118-node system [12]. For each link 
of the network we sample an impedance value. Then, the sampled values are sorted by magnitude in 
ascending order and grouped into: local links, rewire links, and lattice connection links according to 
corresponding proportions. Line reactances in each group are then assigned randomly to the 
corresponding group of links in the topology. We will denote with    the reactances vector associated to 
a particular topology  , where the component   
 
 denotes the reactance of line    .  
With steps 6-7, we extend the RT-nestedSW algorithm to assign electrical properties, 
            —necessary for DC power flow computations and cascading failure analysis as 
described later. Networks described here constitute the baseline systems corresponding to a line 
redundancy level of     (Table 1). Note that changes in   result in changes to the parameters     
   of step 1. We explain next how the line redundancy of these baseline networks is varied to form 
topologies with levels      and    . 
 
3.3 Bounding Models 
The range in which baseline topologies are allowed to vary is bounded from below and above by two 
limiting cases: the power grid‘s spanning tree (ST) which has a minimum level of lines to guarantee 
connectivity, and the greedy triangulation (GT) which approximates the maximum number of lines in a 
two dimensional planar space.  
From each baseline network generated with the RT-nestedSW algorithm,      
        and associated 
impedance vector    , we obtain the       
          and       
          networks. Note that 
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        , while      is the subset of lines belonging to a spanning tree of   , with their respective 
impedances. Similarly,         and      is the superset of lines belonging to the planar triangulation 
of   , where the impedances of the lines belonging to  
        are generated as in subsection 3.2. 
Factor   varies in the range        where 0 indicates the baseline topology G and values in       
represent the percentage of lines belonging to        up to obtaining G. Meanwhile, values in 
      indicate the percentage of lines belonging to        which are added to G up to forming a 
GT. Figure 1 shows topologies for     , 0 and 1. 
 
 
(a)    (b)    (c) 
Figure 1. Sample topologies with different redundancy levels for the same node set layout: (a )      
(           ), (b)     (            , and (c)                  . 
 
3.4 Siting of Loads and Generators 
Power demand vector    and a power supply vector    across the nodes‘ set    , help determine the 
layout for generators/loads within the synthetic power grids, whose assignment is controlled by parameter 
  in Table 1.  From the loads perspective, we use as vector of power demand    a set consistent with the 
IEEE 118-node system [27]. We only retain the original components of the power supply vector    and 
maximum power supply vector      for the 15 major power suppliers, as the IEEE-118 system has 
generators overrepresented (i.e., several serve as boundary conditions to the larger system from which it 
was extracted). We complemented available data in terms of       for the IEEE 118 system, with 
optimal power flow test case data included in Zimmerman et al. [28]. Hence, each component     
       and             represents the power supplied, the maximum power that could be 
supplied, and the power demanded by bus  , respectively (if   is a load node            ). 
Therefore, synthetic power grids are composed by 15 generator buses, 93 load buses and 10 transmission 
buses, to maintain realistic proportions. We use the following procedure which relies on a spectral 
clustering algorithm [29] to assign the bus positions of the 15 generators: 
 
1. Select extremes in the power grid as       (the extremes are the pair of buses most distant 
from each other), and a threshold distance      (intended as number of links as most lines have 
similar length).  
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2. Build the subnetwork ̃     ̃  ̃  by removing from  all the buses that are at a distance more 
than   from    , and divide it in    bus communities  ̃   ̃     ̃   using the spectral 
clustering algorithm. 
3. Select a node at random for each community  ̃ , and assign to it a power supply and maximum 
power supply component. 
 
This procedure forces the generators and the loads to be clustered together depending on: 
 
                           (4) 
 
where      is the minimum distance (in number of links) where at least 15 buses are at a distance less 
than      from     ,      is the diameter of the network and         is the input factor in our 
experiment. Note that in this section we are interested in modelling different load/generator geographic 
layouts. For this reason, Eq.     uses the number of links as distance, as the link length distribution is 
concentrated on a small range of values [30], and thus adequate to capture geographic patterns; 
alternatives such as electrical distances [31], are also desirable for dynamic analyses, but not necessarily 
to reproduce geographical layout patterns as in Figure 2. This figure has three examples of generator 
positioning for different values of  , so as to assist unraveling the impacts of generator siting on 
cascading failures.   
 
In Eq.    , as K approaches  , d  approaches      and only a few nodes close to the network extremes 
are available to become power generators.  This results in most power generators concentrated in a small 
portion of the power grid, spatially distinct with respect to the rest of the grid. As K approaches   more 
and more nodes become available as generators, hence power can be supplied by buses all over the power 
grid, and the spatial distinction between generators and loads blurs.  In particular, the values of   
considered for sensitivity analysis are:  ,     and   (Table 1). This factor allow us exploring the effect of 
spatially distributed versus centralized power generation, which is of interest from a ―smart grid‖ 
perspective, especially as the mainly centralized power generation structure of existing grids evolves into 
one that admits decentralization and distributed generation [1]. As the position of power generating units 
has been found in Pahwa et al. [13] to affect the frequency and voltage stability of power grids, position 
determines the paths in DC power flows.  
 
 
(a)    (b)    (c) 
 
Figure 2. Sample networks with different generator set positions according to: (a)   , (b)      , 
and (c)   . Nodes with black fill are generators; other nodes are loads. 
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3.5 Line Capacity Assignments 
To perform cascading failure simulations, it is necessary to also have transmission lines‘ capacity data 
consistent with functional systems. In real power system lines, capacities belong to a set of finite discrete 
values, while power grids are usually     compliant. To produce synthetic power networks with these 
features, we build a model for the line capacity allocation that differs from a proportional model usually 
found in the literature [13], [32], [5], [33]. Therefore, to sample the capacity    of line  , we base our 
model on a truncated exponential distribution, Eq. (5), with parameter   estimated from the power flow-
to-capacity ratio data of a large real system (we used a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to confirm that the 
exponential model was not rejected).  Specifically, we studied the Polish grid available in Zimmerman et 
al. [28] to set our exponential model, as it is one of the most complete power transmission network 
datasets (note that the IEEE 118 system does not offer such details): 
 
   |     
       
 |  | 
 
 |  |
 
  ( 
 |  |
  
   
  
 
 |  |
  
   
)
 
(  
      
   ]
         (5) 
 
where   is the indicator function,   is the redundancy level of the network to which line   belongs to, 
   
    is a capacity limit dependent on the line redundancy,    is the power flowing through   when the 
DC power flow is computed on the full network, and   
    is: 
 
  
        |  | |  
 | |  
 |   |  
 |             (6) 
 
with   
  as the power flowing through line   when line   is removed from   , considering   
   , and 
  |  |. Note that the support of the probability density function (pdf) in Eq. (5), for different values 
of    and   
   , covers capacity values that are finite and guarantee     compliance. However, since 
we want our sample to belong to a discrete set of capacities, we discretize Eq. (5) among equally spaced 
quantiles:    ̅    ̅     ̅   , where  
  is dependent on the average number of lines of the networks 
with redundancy  : 
 
       ̅|     
       
 
 
 |  |
 ̅   
 
 |  |
 ̅   
  ( 
 |  |
  
   
  
 
 |  |
  
   
)
 
(  
      
   ]
   ̅ .     (7) 
 
The distribution in Eq. (7) reflects discrete and finite capacities as seen in real systems.  Our line power 
flow-capacity ratios are distributed in a similar way to the Polish grid as a reference, and are initially 
    compliant. The demanding computation here is for   
   
, as one needs to compute the power flow 
for a network with one of its lines removed, for all of its lines in all the generated networks.  After 
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applying consecutively all the procedures just described, a complete set of synthetic DC power grid 
models   is obtained whose elements    are defined as in Eq. (1). 
 
4. CASCADING FAILURE MODEL 
In the following sections we explain the cascading failure model employed to study all the power grid 
configurations in . 
 
4.1 Algorithm for Cascading Failure Process 
The general steps are illustrated in Algorithm 4.1 (Cascading failure simulator, CFS) based on Bienstock 
[2]. The algorithm receives as input a power grid object , and the indices of the initial couple of line 
failures         to study N-2 reliability compliance. Then, Step 1 computes the power flow at the 
equilibrium state before initial failures. Step 2 applies the initial failure to the power grid by removing the 
targeted lines. Then, each iteration   of the For loop corresponds to a failure event in the cascade 
simulation [i.e., when some lines become overloaded, with     corresponding to the initial failure of 
       ]. If the initial failure does not lead to a cascade, then CFS 4.1 stops at    . Step 3 is necessary in 
order to deal with islanding when line failures break the original network   into multiple connected 
components which might have an imbalance in power supply or demand [34]. Step 3 is handled by a DC 
re-dispatch logic that will be explained in Section 4.2. At the end of the simulation, systemic metrics 
     
        
 and      
       
 are computed, and after the algorithm has run for all the couples of lines of the 
network,      and     are computed as in Eq (2)-(3). 
 
Algorithm  4.1: CASCADING FAILURE SIMULATOR (CFS) 
Input: Power network , initial failures         
1.     ,compute    vector of power flow in   
2.         {      }                 
For:         Do 
3. Adjust load and generation  := {proportional or OPA} strategy 
4. Compute    power flow vector in   
5. Identify    as the set of lines outaged in iteration r 
If |  |    
6. Set                                 
Otherwise: END 
 
4.2 Re-Dispatch Logic 
During a cascading failure it is possible that an originally connected power network becomes separated in 
  subnetworks or islands:                  [2]. Each island, being a subset of the original power grid 
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 , is defined consistently with Eq. (1) as follows: 
       
                                                . In principle, islands do not have 
balanced power supply and demand, thus requiring a readjustment in vectors       through an 
operation called re-dispatch. Re-dispatch is not a property of the power grid structure of Eq. (1), and 
hence it is embedded in Step 3 of the CFS Algorithm 4.1. We could have chosen other control actions; 
however, re-dispatch is still one of the most common operational actions used to reduce costs and 
counteract line overloads. Meanwhile, other operations such as transmission switching are mainly applied 
for planned outage management and costs reduction, but their impact on reliability is only starting to be 
understood [35].  Hence, at each iteration   of an overloading event, the proportional routine adjusts 
power in                  as follows:  
 
               
       
     
 
    
       
        (8) 
 
where    ,    and    take different values depending on particular situations: 
 
   
   
   
   
                            
          
         (9) 
        
          
           
          
    
                
                               
          
     (10) 
   
     
   
            
        
   
      
                 
                 (11) 
 
where       
    ∑    
   
   
    ,       
    ∑    
   
   
    are the total power generated and demanded in 
island j before the overloading event r. Also,          ∑              is the total power capacity of 
the island. This proportional logic is simple by not taking into account the capacities of the surviving lines 
in the system and is close to a ―no-redispatch simulation‖, particularly as it maintains power balance in 
the network with limited optimization steps, intervening only in case of islanding. Proportional power 
generation is still frequently used in practice as in the case of generator disconnections [34]. In the case of 
fast cascading failures, there could be insufficient time to carry out more sophisticated than proportional 
interventions. Hence, the proportional logic offers a suitable baseline for comparison with more 
sophisticated optimization based strategies. 
 
In contrast, the OPA model re-dispatches power by solving the following linear program for each island 
                : 
 
               solve : 
 
          ∑                ∑                   (12) 
 
Subject to: 
 
              
                     (13) 
                    
           (14) 
∑                    ∑     
    
   
       
          (15) 
                                                 (16) 
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where     is the     row of the susceptance matrix   of the network.  The objective function in Eq. (12) 
allows to re-dispatch power giving priority to generators by penalizing power demand modifications, as 
avoided whenever possible in practice. Constraints in Eq. (13) make sure that the power supplied by each 
generator is always below its maximum capacity, while constraints in Eq. (14) bound the power 
demanded from each load to its initial value (when the grid is in equilibrium). Constraints in Eq. (15) 
ensure that in each island, supply and demand are balanced, and constraints in Eq. (16) force the re-
dispatch action to respect the surviving lines‘ capacities. Since in real situations the thermal rating of 
transmission lines is never known exactly and depends on external conditions as well as intrinsic 
properties of the material and shape of the conductors, a small error noise      is introduced in the 
nominal capacity value   .    is randomly sampled from a uniform distribution between -0.01 and 0.01 
every time the optimization is performed. After solving the linear program, the power supply/demand of 
each bus in      is adjusted: 
 
   
     
                
         (17) 
   
     
                
         (18) 
 
The OPA model is a simplification of how a power grid operator might intervene in re-dispatching power. 
It has been used to solve optimization problems related to the prevention of blackouts [36], as well as to 
study the vulnerability of interdependent systems [37]. 
 
 
5. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Impact of Topology on Cascade Failure Vulnerability 
Figure 3 shows the log-log and semi-log plots of the tail distribution of response variables       and      
for the original synthetic power grids and the two bounding topologies derived in Section 3.3, 
representing various line redundancy factors  . 
As expected, the complementary cumulative distribution function (ccdf) for baseline networks (   ) is 
halfway vulnerable between power delivery interruptions in the tree network (    ) and the greedy 
triangulation       [Figure 3(a)]. For     , the power grids show high probabilities of power 
losses, as the probability of         
    is above    . Since power losses depend on islanding and 
bus disconnections in our model, such strategies are at odds when      as only minimal sets of lines 
necessary to ensure connectivity are present. Hence, each line failure is sufficient to split the grids into 
multiple connected components and, depending on the position of generators, cause power losses. When 
    and    , topologies are less sensitive to line failure given more alternative paths to satisfy 
demands, and in most cases few failures do not alter system-level functional pathways. In fact, the 
probability of having         
    after a double contingency is approximately    for    , and 
below       for    . However, note that the tail of the ccdf for     still reaches values 
comparable to the worst scenarios in the tree networks, signaling undesirable configurations although at a 
much lower frequency. No such configuration are present in the greedy triangulation given the short tail. 
The maximum power losses for the three different configuration are: 3,879 MW for     , 3,098 MW 
for     and 598 MW for     on a total initial power production of 4,377 MW.  
The role of line redundancy is different with respect to     , where Figure 3(b) shows that the     
topologies have higher probabilities of additional line failures after the initial double line contingency. 
This is because line overloads affect lines belonging to alternative paths, and since in      
configurations only one path exists between each couple of buses, no overload due to power flow re-
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distribution is possible. In contrast, the      and     topologies can be subject to line failures when 
the power flow is re-directed. The tail distribution of       is higher for     than     showing that 
      is non-linear and non-monotonic with respect to  . The     networks have a much higher 
number of alternative paths than the      configurations, thus the power flow re-directed by the initial 
line failures is dispersed among a larger set of possible alternative routes.  Specific results show that the 
maximum number of consecutive overloads for the three different structures is 4 for     , 28 for 
    and 15 for    . 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 3. Probabilistic response variables as a function of topology variations governed by  : (a) log-log 
plot of the tail distributions of      , and (b) semi-log plot for the tail distribution of     . 
 
5.2 Impact of Generators Positions 
Regarding the electrical structure, there is impact from different positions of generator buses via the   
factor (spanning from a centralized power supply layout to a distributed one). Figure 4 shows the log-log 
plot of the empirical tail distributions for       and semi-log of the same quantity for       for the 
different levels of factor  —here we considered 60 different configurations per group for a total of 360 
cases. 
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   (a)      (b)    
Figure 4. Probabilistic response variables as a function of siting factor K: (a) log-log plot of the tail 
distributions of      , and (b) semi log plot for the tail distribution of    . 
 
Figures 4(a)-(b) show that the probability of both high power losses and additional line failures decreases 
as   increases (i.e., as we move from a centralized structure to a distributed one). In fact, centralized 
power generation structures have important tie lines which connect the power supply agglomerates with 
the power demand sites. Failing these tie lines cause more widespread power interruptions as reflected in 
the higher values of expected      . In contrast, the distributed generation cases (   ) are more robust 
since the supply and demand buses are spread through the network and not separable by a few line 
failures. These general considerations do not apply equally to every topological type, as one can see from 
the multivariate chart for the     groups in Figure 5. As expected,      networks are greatly 
influenced by the siting of generators. In fact, in centralized generator configurations the number of tie 
lines is minimal for this type of network. Even the initial double contingency, in some configurations, can 
disconnect entirely the supply nodes from the demand nodes. The other network topologies are not so 
sensitive, thanks to their N-1 compliant design, as even when all generators are clustered together, there is 
enough redundancy in the tie lines to prevent the complete power supply/demand disconnection (see 
Figure 2 for clustering examples).  
The layout of load and generators seem to affect the line outages      in all configurations, especially the 
    case. For      the distributed generators slightly increase the quantity of line outages in the 
networks     —an opposite trend with respect to        . Overall, one notices that the role of  , at 
low to medium levels that capture most realistic systems, is critical with respect to   in determining the 
behavior of both power losses and line failures. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 5: Multivariate chart of the group average of (a)     , and (b)     with respect to   and . 
 
5.3 Impact of Re-Dispatch Policy 
In addition to the topological structure and electrical features of a power grid, the re-dispatch of power 
generation is one of the most frequently used control actions taken by operators to decrease operational 
costs and increase reliability (thus essential in the case of islanding [34]). When contingencies strike, re-
dispatch is also applied as a mitigation action to avoid additional cascade failures; however, in some real 
fast-evolving cases, wrong re-dispatch can actually worsen the situation [38]. Figure 6 shows the log-log 
plot of the tail distribution for       and the semi-log plot of the tail distribution for      , across cases 
which share the same re-dispatch procedure. In particular, we consider a proportional procedure and the 
OPA model. The impact of the more sophisticated OPA control strategy in preventing overloads is clear 
in Figure 6(b). In fact, different from the proportional model which tries to accommodate the demand in a 
greedy way, the OPA model sacrifices power demand in order to prevent line failures whenever the linear 
program (12)-(18) is feasible, thus preventing cascading failures to spread. Regarding      , OPA seems 
to succeed in reducing power losses in the most extreme scenarios, but does not have significant impact 
on small and medium power outages as evidenced in Figure 6(a). This is because the OPA policy focuses 
on optimizing power losses under the constraint of no additional overloads [Eq. (16)], thus avoiding 
extended cascades which represents the extreme scenarios where large amounts of power are lost. 
Figure 7 shows the multivariate chart for     , comparing the mean effect of the combinations of the re-
dispatch factor with topology and generator position. The OPA re-dispatch successfully prevents line 
failures in all different topologies and also with respect to all generator configurations in K. Overall, the 
best improvement is obtained in the intermediate line redundancy level     which was identified as 
more vulnerable to line overloads (and the closest to redundancy levels in practice). Meanwhile,      
offers no discernible interaction pattern, mainly because as noted in Figure 6, the main effect of the re-
dispatch factor on      is itself weak, influencing the outcomes of only rare scenarios. 
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   (a)       (b)    
Figure 6. Probabilistic response variables as a function of re-dispatch strategy: (a) log-log plot of the tail 
distributions of      , and (b) semi-log plot for the tail distribution of    . 
 
 
   (a)      (b)    
Figure 7. Multivariate chart for identifying interactions between (a) re-dispatch and topology, and (b) re-
dispatch and generator siting K. 
 
6. Discussion: Guidelines for Power Grid Design and Operation 
This work shows that line redundancy and generator/load layout factors have a significant impact on the 
robustness of power grids to power loss and cascading line failures. From the line redundancy 
perspective, a minimum amount of redundant transmission lines is clearly necessary to avoid power 
interruptions every time a line fails. As shown in Figure 3, if topologies are denser than the      case 
(approaching the     layout), power losses decrease, although it is still possible to overload lines due 
to power flow re-distribution, and lead to widespread blackouts. At an extreme, if a considerable number 
of redundant lines are added (approaching the     layout), it becomes possible to do both: 
significantly decrease the overload frequency of the transmission lines and avoid large blackouts. In 
practice, however, building new transmission is too expensive to pursue a     power grid. Therefore, 
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we identify a baseline combination of the topological factors of redundancy and generator layout which, 
while being attainable in practice, still achieve a good level of protection to cascading failures. To this 
end, we perform additional simulations with power networks with intermediate redundancy levels, in-
between           . Since the design of the control strategy can be carried out independently from 
the choices of   and  , we perform simulations with the proportional re-dispatch only. In this way we 
obtain lower bounds on the power network robustness that can then be further improved by applying a 
more sophisticated control strategy, such as OPA (Figures 6-7). Figures 8(a)-(b) show the confidence 
intervals for the mean of      and      as we vary the redundancy level of the baseline case (0 on the x-
axis) toward -1 or 1 with proportional re-dispatch.  
 
   
   (a)      (b)    
Figure 8. Confidence intervals of the group mean of (a)      and (b)      for different line redundancy 
values. 
Figure 8(a) shows that adding lines always helps saving power losses as      is monotonically decreasing. 
The behavior of      is more complex and not monotonic as also evidenced in Figure 3. Having only a 
few redundant lines above the ST configuration leads to highly vulnerable topologies, while continuing to 
add more lines after the peak slowly improves the situation [Figure 8(b)]. Also, after     of the lines 
which separate    from   are added to the latter, significant improvement is achieved, but beyond that 
point improvement is marginal. Hence, building new transmission lines would not be the most economic 
and time efficient strategy to reduce the power grid risk of cascading failures for denser topologies, so 
measures relying on control strategies and/or distributed generators should also be tried. 
Considering the layout of loads and generators we show they affect mainly     . On average, more 
distributed configurations render less power loss and noticeably smaller cascading failures. The 
magnitude of the improvements depends on the redundancy level of the network. In particular, the lower 
the number of redundant lines in the grid the more sensitive the responses changes in generator layout. 
Figure 9 shows the confidence intervals for the mean of      and     as we vary the redundancy level of 
the baseline topology for the three different generators layouts. Looking at the confidence bands in 
Figures 8(b) and 9(b), we notice how for Ntot the intervals are wider for sparse topologies and clustered 
generators layouts. 
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     (a)                (b)    
Figure 9. Confidence intervals of the group means of (a)      and (b)      for different line redundancy 
values and generator layouts. 
These results suggest that dispersing power generating units across the power grid helps to avoid line 
overloads whenever the number of redundant lines is not sufficient. This type of intervention is happening 
ad-hoc via smart grid technologies and distributed generation (DG) today. Most likely, combinations of 
transmission line build up and DG, which require novel controls, offer a foreseeable solution to manage 
power losses and cascades in evolving power systems.  
Regarding re-dispatch, we find it has a determinant role in avoiding the overload of additional 
transmission lines after initial contingencies materialize. Moreover, corrective re-dispatch actions interact 
in a synergistic way with the power grid topologies, bringing weaker configurations at approximately the 
same level of the stronger ones. In power grids vulnerable to overload, the optimized OPA model could 
generally avoid large scale cascades and associated blackouts, relative to simpler proportional strategies.  
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
This study develops new strategies to evaluate cascading failure dynamics through a broad set of realistic 
power grid topologies operated with different power re-dispatch strategies. Cascading failures are 
sensitive to the initial power grid topology, supply/demand states, and the control actions applied while 
cascades evolve. Most existing work is specific to case study systems with set topology, and thus 
conclusions are typically not generalizable. The approach taken in this work is instead to explore key 
topological, electrical and control inputs across realistic power grids in order to find parameter settings to 
safeguard grids from cascading failures. The quantitative results drawn from this exploration are 
translated into high-level guidelines for reliability-based power grid design that are generalizable, since 
the global-to-local computational strategy employed here is probabilistic and accommodates an ensemble 
of topological and electrical system configurations.  
Results show that for reducing the probability of large power losses, improvements at the structure/layout 
levels are necessary, including strategies that increase line redundancy, decentralize generators, or use 
combinations of them (at levels not too distant from realistic system configurations). Meanwhile, if major 
risks derive from too frequent overloads, it is better to inspect the control policies currently employed in 
the system and assess if it is necessary to improve or optimize them. In particular, power re-dispatch 
shows that line overload containment through optimized load shedding and power generation re-
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scheduling is effective in prevent the propagation of failures in all the power grid configurations 
considered. 
Overall results show that the best practical solution to the problem of minimizing the probability of power 
losses and multiple line overloads is to have a topology slightly more redundant than the average level for 
realistic systems         , coupled with distributed generators layout      . In addition to this 
topological solution, an optimized re-dispatch strategy would bring even greater benefits by curtailing the 
few cascading failures that still can breach a robust power network design.  Also, increased line 
redundancy and generator decentralization levels reduce the variability of performance measures, such as 
the number of lines overloaded, furthering the manageability of complex power systems. 
Future research includes extending the computational experiments presented in this work by considering 
AC power flow [34] and other forms of control actions such as those that modify the topology of the grid 
[35]. Moreover, instead of considering single or double contingencies, the initial failure events could be 
generated with hazard-consistent simulation approaches, so as to represent risk due to extreme events and 
quantify the associated uncertainty in the cascading dynamics of power grid systems. 
 
NOTATION LIST: 
Factors 
 :  line redundancy factor 
 :  generator layout factor 
    re-dispatch factor 
 
Sets 
  : set of power grid objects 
 : set of arcs of the graph representing the power grid topology 
 :  set of vertex of the graph representing the power grid topology 
 
Objects: 
  : power grid object 
  : power grid object at initial state  
  : power grid configuration after the rth line failure event   
 
Power grid electrical parameters: 
 : vector containing the impedances of the arcs  
  : vector containing the power demands for buses in the power grid 
   : power demand for bus   
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  : vector containing the power supplies for buses in the power grid 
   : power supply for bus   
    : vector containing the power supplies limits for buses in the power grid 
     : power supply limit for bus   
 : vector containing the capacities for the arcs in the power grid 
 
Power flow and capacity allocation parameters and variables: 
  : line of the power grid defined as an arc with impedance and capacity         
   : power flowing through line   
  
  : power flowing through line   when only line   is failed  
  
   : maximum power flowing through   obtained from     contigency analysis 
   : power flow vector associated with    
  ̅ : i
th
  smaller capacity value  that can be sampled from the capacity distribution 
   
   : maximum capacity value allowed for a given value of line redundancy   
 
Re-dispatch parameters and variables: 
   : coefficient for proportional power generator adjustment for bus   (proportional re-dispatch) 
   : constant coefficient for power generator adjustment for bus   (proportional re-dispatch) 
  : coefficient for proportional power demand adjustment for bus   (proportional re-dispatch) 
    : power generation adjustment vector (OPA re-dispatch) 
    : power demand adjustment vector (OPA re-dispatch) 
    : power generation adjustment for bus   (OPA re-dispatch) 
    : power demand adjustment for bus   (OPA re-dispatch) 
  : susceptance matrix 
   : noise in the capacity nominal value for line     
 
Response measures: 
     
        
: amount of power not supplied at the final state when       are selected as initial failures 
     
        
: amount of lines failed at the final state when       are selected as initial failures 
    : total power loss across N-2 contingencies 
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    : total cascading lines across N-2 contingencies 
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